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Abstract
In the literature of new trade theory, most studies have dealt with industrial
location by imposing an assumption of free transportation in the agricultural sector.
We explicitly incorporate arbitrary transport costs in both the manufacturing and
agricultural sectors into the Helpman-Krugman-Davis model of two countries and
one production factor. The following results are obtained. First, we nd a necessary
and sucient condition for the home market eect (HME) to be observed. Secondly,
we nd that integrating manufacturing markets has contrastive impacts on two
countries to integrating the agricultural markets. Our results are suggestive for the
understanding of various international trade agreements.
Key words: Transport costs, Firm location, Home market eect, Welfare.
JEL Classication: F12, Q17, R1.
Corresponding author. Graduate School of Management, Kagawa University, Saiwai-cho 2-1, Taka-
matsu, Kagawa 760-8523, Japan. E-mail:takatsuka@gsm.kagawa-u.ac.jp
yGraduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University, Aoba 6-3-09, Aramaki, Aoba-ku,
Sendai, Miyagi 980-8579, Japan. E-mail:zeng@se.is.tohoku.ac.jpElectronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743266
1 Introduction
One of the most remarkable economic phenomena of the modern society is the large
growth of the world's trade volume. Starting with the General Agreement on Taris
and Trade (GATT) signed in January, 1948, the world has been reshaped by competing
forces of trade integration. Trade is indeed one of the principal drivers of the growth of
Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) and BRICs. Such a change motivates a careful
investigation of the welfare eects of deeper trade integration.
Since Krugman (1980), New Trade Theory (NTT) has been developed to study the
increasing returns technology and monopolistic competition in trade, and the results suc-
cessfully explain why countries at the same time import and export the products of the
same industry (intra-industry trade). The general framework in NTT is able to handle
arbitrary manufacturing trade costs, which makes it possible to conduct research on trade
integration in detail. It is noteworthy that Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985) nd that country size is inuential in international trade. In a world of two asym-
metric countries, the larger one succeeds in attracting a more-than-proportionate share
of manufacturing rms, and the tendency is strengthened by decreasing transport costs.
This is often called the home market eect (HME). Furthermore, the HME is larger for
smaller manufacturing trade costs (e.g., Head and Ries, 2001, p.866). The result of shrink-
ing the manufacturing industry in a small country from trade integration raises a natural
question: Do large/small countries gain from the trade integration from the viewpoint of
welfare?
Nevertheless, most economists who examine the role of market size have not ana-
lyzed the eects of integration on national welfare (e.g., Davis, 1998; Head et al., 2002;
Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004; Yu, 2005; Crozet and Trionfetti, 2008; Zeng and Kikuchi,
2009). Some studies regarding the HME have focused on the gains and losses from trade,
but the comparisons are limited to completely free-trade economies with entirely autarky
economies (Krugman, 1981; Venables, 1987).1 Although some recent empirical studies
(e.g., Bernard et al., 2003; Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Beine and Coulombe, 2007 ;
Behrens et al., 2009) suggest the importance of a welfare analysis, no such theoretical
work has been published.
One reason for this research gap is the free-trade assumption imposed on the agri-
cultural sector since Helpman and Krugman (1985). This convenient assumption makes
the analysis of the manufacturing sector much easier, and, therefore, is accepted in most
1Venables (1987, Section VII) also examines the eects of unilateral trade policies on national welfare
and shows that the national welfare is raised by an increase in its import tari. This paper does not treat
such an asymmetric reduction of trade barriers.
1subsequent studies on this subject. Nevertheless, in the real world, agricultural trans-
portation incurs positive costs, as the same as in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore,
the free-trade assumption has at least two theoretical defects. First, the wages in the two
countries are equalized under this assumption, failing to capture the great wage gap be-
tween developed countries and developing countries. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000)
and Baldwin et al. (2003) conducted some welfare analysis under the free-trade assump-
tion in the agricultural sector and show that a reduction of frictional barriers between
asymmetric-sized nations improves the welfare of both nations. However, their results
are limited in the sense that the eects of globalization on national welfare through wage
incomes are ignored. Secondly, the assumption makes it impossible to examine the inte-
gration of agricultural markets. In the real world, some countries, such as Japan, carefully
protect their agricultural markets. Nevertheless, most NTT papers treat globalization (or
economic integration) as a reduction of barriers to trade manufacturing (dierentiated)
goods only (e.g., Krugman and Venables, 1990, 1995; Baldwin and Venables, 1995).
The importance of agricultural transport cost is rst recognized by Davis (1998), who
shows that the HME of Helpman and Krugman (1985) disappears if the agricultural good
is transported with the same positive cost as the manufactured goods. Fortunately, the
model of Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Davis (1998) can be used in our research.
Specically, we maintain the structure of two asymmetric-sized countries, one production
factor (labor), and two sectors (manufacturing and agriculture), but we allow for arbi-
trary trade costs in both sectors. This makes it possible to compare the integration of
manufacturing and agricultural markets. Furthermore, we are able to analyze the eects
of integration on welfare at arbitrary level of trade costs. By doing so, we clarify when
the progress of economic integration produces (or does not produce) a conict of interest
between the two countries.
To the best of our knowledge, the equilibrium analysis of the Helpman-Krugman-
Davis model is incomplete. While Helpman and Krugman (1985) focus on the case of free
transportation in the agricultural sector, Davis (1998) mainly considers the case of equal
transportation costs in two sectors. The case of arbitrary trade costs in the agricultural
sector remains unclear. Therefore, before the welfare analysis, we rigorously re-examine
the equilibrium of industrial location and wage for arbitrary trade costs in two sectors.
We obtained the following results. First, we found a necessary and sucient condition
for observing the HME. The condition is in regard to the trade costs of manufacturing
and agricultural goods, and the conclusion aids in the comprehensive understanding of
some known results scattered in the literature. Secondly, when the manufacturing markets
are more deeply integrated, the number of rms in the larger country (resp. the smaller
2country) evolves as an inverted U-shaped curve (resp. a U-shaped curve). Meanwhile, the
smaller country is denitely better o, whereas the larger one could be worse o. Thirdly,
when the agricultural markets are more deeply integrated, the number of rms in the
larger country (resp. the smaller country) monotonically increases (resp. decreases).
Meanwhile, the smaller country is denitely worse o regarding the interior equilibrium,
whereas the welfare in the larger country must be improved. In summary, the integration
of manufacturing markets does not threaten the smaller country even if more rms relocate
to the larger country. Rather, the integration of agricultural markets threatens the smaller
country.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a review of the model
of Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Davis (1998). Section 3 is a detailed description of
the relationship among trade costs, rm location, and the HME. Section 4 is an analysis
of the welfare, and Section 5, the conclusion.
2 The Model
The economy consists of two countries (the north (N) and the south (S)), two sectors
(manufacturing and agriculture), and one factor (labor). The amount of labor in country
N is denoted as L, and its counterpart in country S is denoted with an asterisk. The
worldwide endowment Lw = L + L is xed. Denote  = L=Lw. We assume that country
N is larger so that  2 (1=2;1).
The manufacturing sector M consists of a continuum of product varieties and is char-
acterized by increasing returns to scale (IRS) and monopolistic competition, while the
agricultural sector A produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale (CRS)
and perfect competition.
Workers are assumed to hold the same preference, which is described by a Cobb-















nw is the number of varieties in the M sector, and m(i) is the consumption of variety i.
3Parameter  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of good M,
and  2 (0;1) is the expenditure share on good M.
As in most related papers, we assume Samuelson's iceberg trade costs. Specically, M
(resp. A) units of the good M (resp. good A) must be shipped for one unit to reach the
other country. We assume that M 2 (1;1) and A  1 in the paper. As in Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2000, p.770), we might interpret that M and A include (or are equal
to) taris. However, even if such an interpretation is applied, in the following analysis,
we assume that tari revenue plays a negligible role in national welfare calculations, as is
the case of all OECD nations (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2000, p.775).
Each worker owns one unit of labor. In the manufacturing production, each rm needs
a marginal cost of (   1)= units of labor and a xed cost of f units of labor. Thus,
there is only one production factor, which is immobile across countries in the model.
We normalize the wage in S as w = 1 and denote the wage in N as w. Meanwhile,
in the agricultural production, one unit of labor produces one unit of good A; then, the
prices of good A in N and S are
pA = w; p

A = w
 = 1, (2)
respectively. It is noteworthy that the wage is the only income of workers. Therefore, the
total expenditures in the two countries are
E = Lw; E
 = L
, (3)
respectively. On the other hand, the total costs of producing x units of manufactured
varieties in the two countries are c(x) = fw +(   1)wx= and c(x) = f +(   1)x=,
respectively.
Let p be the price of a manufacturing variety in country N made in country N, p be
the price of a variety in country S made in country S,  p be the price of a variety in country
N made in country S, and  p be the price of a variety in country S made in country N.2
Then, the monopolistic competition framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) suggests that
p = w; p
 = 1;  p = M;  p
 = wM: (4)
From (1), the demand (plus iceberg costs) of each variety produced in N is
dM = 
p 




2Because of symmetry among varieties, this price is independent of the variety name.
4where P and P  are the manufacturing price indices in the two countries, respectively.

















where n and n are numbers of rms in the two countries, respectively. On the other






A = (1   )E
; (7)
respectively.
In the model, free entry and exit of rms are assumed so that rms have zero prot.
The output and input of each rm in the two countries are, therefore,
x = x
 = f; (8)
l = l
 = f; (9)
respectively. Thus, from (3), (4), (5), (6), and (8), the market-clearing conditions for



















where M  
1 
M is the trade freeness of manufactured varieties.
3 Trade Costs, Firm Location, and the Home Market
Eect
In this section, we examine the equilibrium rm location. Following Krugman (1980),
Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Davis (1998), we apply the following denition in
this paper:
Denition 1 The home market eect (HME) is the situation of
n
n + n >  (12)
5at equilibrium.
If good A is not traded between two countries, the total output of good A is (1 )L

















n + n = :
In other words, the HME disappears when good A is nontradable. Substituting (13) into
(11), we obtain
F(w)  (w
1    wM)   (w
   M)(1   ) = 0 (14)
after simplication. Therefore, the equilibrium wage is determined by (14) when A is not
traded. Clearly, F(w) decreases in w, and it holds that










(1   ) < 0;
where the inequalities are from  2 (1=2;1) and M < 1. Thus, (14) has a unique
solution, which is denoted by e w, and lies in (1;
 1

M ). On the other hand, w = A when
A is traded.3 Therefore, e w is the highest value of the agricultural trade cost for A to be
traded. Accordingly, we sometimes use e A to denote e w, indicating the fact that good A
is nontradable if and only if A  e A.
We also know that e A is an increasing function of M by applying the implicit function
theorem to (14). Furthermore, if M is large so that M approaches 1, then e A approaches
[=(1   )]1=(2 1), which is illustrated in Figure 1.
Together with the analysis for the case of tradable good A, we have the following
results:
Proposition 1 (i) Good A is tradable if and only if A < e A;
(ii) the HME is observed, and the larger country is the net exporter of good M if A < e A;
otherwise, manufacturing rms are distributed in proportion to country size.
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(II)
(I)
A = e A
I
Figure 1: The existence of the HME
Proof: See Appendix A. 
As shown in Figure 1, the above result is helpful to comprehensively understand some
known results scattered in the literature. Typically, good A is tradable when A = 1.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) examined the rms' location in this case. They nd the
HME in which country N is a net exporter of good M, which can be expressed by the
following expression:
n









where M  
1 
M is the trade freeness of manufactured varieties. Proposition 1 (ii)
generalizes (15) and shows that the HME is observed in the whole shaded area of Figure
1, i.e., as long as A < e A. Since e A < M, the HME disappears when A = M. This
special result was originally provided in Davis (1998), and the above result demonstrates
that the HME generally disappears for all A  e A. Davis (1998) tried a generalization
in his Section III C but did not obtain a necessary and sucient condition. Yu (2005,
p.261) shows that good A is not traded if A  
 1

M , which is only a sucient condition.
Crozet and Trionfetti (2008, p.313) conclude that the sucient condition for the HME to
exist is A < 
 1

M in our notations. However, their result is based on a dierent denition
of the HME: the situation in which there exists a   2 (1=2;1) such that dn=d > 1 holds
7for all  >  , which is neither sucient nor necessary for (12).
Next, we consider how rms relocate when either M or A falls. We have the following
result:
Proposition 2 At the interior equilibrium with tradable A,
(i) the rm number in the larger country (resp. the smaller country) monotonically in-
creases (resp. decreases) when A falls;
(ii) the rm number in the larger country (resp. the smaller country) evolves as an in-
verted U-shaped curve (resp. a U-shaped curve) when M falls.
Proof: See Appendix B. 
To understand Proposition 2 (i), we note that the relative wage in N increases in
A as long as A is tradable, since it holds that w = A. The wage dierential has two
eects. On the one hand, it has an impact on the production side. Firms pay the wages
as production costs; thus, more rms are attracted from S to N if w or A falls. On the
other hand, it also has an impact on the demand side. When w falls, the consumption
of A in country N decreases. If A is nontradable, then the decreased local demand of A
releases labor from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector. As a result, the
manufacturing sector in country N expands in this case. However, if A is tradable, then
country N decreases its import of A from country S, and the deducted wage income in N
shrinks the market size of manufactured goods so that more rms are likely to move out
from the market to save transport costs. Proposition 2 (i) shows that the eect across
countries denitely dominates the eect across sectors in our setup. Therefore, the rm
number in N (resp. S) monotonically increases (resp. decreases) for a falling A. Such a
change is shown by vector (I) in Figure 1.
Helpman and Krugman (1985) conclude that a small country is de-industrialized when
the manufacturing markets are more integrated. Proposition 2 (ii) shows that their result
is not valid when the agricultural trade costs are positive. Specically, there is a re-
dispersion process whereby rms return to the small country for a suciently small M.
This is because the dispersion force of a higher wage in the larger country dominates the
agglomeration force due to the market size.4 Such a change occurs on the vector (II) in
Figure 1.
In summary, the argument of Helpman and Krugman (1985) turns out to be true for
a falling A rather than M. This result is consistent with a history of industrialization
in England in the 19th Century. According to Bairoch (1988, p.340), from the 1860s, the
4Zeng and Kikuchi (2009) analytically show this fact with a model based on Ottaviano et al. (2002).
8pronounced liberalization of tari policies for the importation of food encouraged buyers
to satisfy demand by turning to the open lands overseas. This resulted in the labor
release from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector in the country, and, thus,
industrialization was accelerated.
4 Welfare
In this section, we focus on the welfare side of the model. The indirect utility of workers






















From the above equations, we know that the welfare in each country is determined by
three factors: the trade freeness of good M (M), the number of rms (n, n), and the
wage in N (w). Clearly, if other things are equal, the rst two factors have positive eects
on the welfare in both countries. On the other hand, the third one has a positive eect on
local welfare and a negative one on foreign welfare. For example, a higher wage w in N
implies a higher price of manufactured varieties produced there, which lowers the welfare
in S. Meanwhile, in country N, the higher wage also implies a higher income, dominating
the negative eect of higher prices and leading to a higher local welfare.
First, we derive the following result for the welfare comparison:
Proposition 3 The welfare in the larger country is always higher than that in the smaller
country.
Proof. The previous section shows that w = A if good A is tradable and w = e A when
A is nontradable. In either case, we have w < 
 1

M < M, which implies w1  > M >
Mw1 . Therefore, it holds that
n
n > 1 >
w1    M
w1    M(w1 )2 =
w1    M
w1  (1   Mw1 )
, (17)
5For simplicity, a constant multiplier, (1   )1 , is omitted in each equation.











which derives ! > ! according to (16). 
Subsequently, we examine how the welfare in each country changes when either trade
cost M or A decrease.
4.1 Falling M
This subsection focuses on the decreasing M, as illustrated by vector (II) in Figure 1.
We consider the case of tradable A (the shaded area in Figure 1) in Section 4.1.1 and the
case of nontradable A in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 The case of tradable good A
In this case, the large country imports good A from the small country (see Appendix A













where A  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M   [1 + (A   1)]M + A








M   [1 + (A   1)]
 
A M + (1   )
(A   AM)(A   AM)
. (20)
It is noteworthy that the above equations are true only if the RHSs of (19) and (20) are
nonnegative. Otherwise (see footnote 3),
n =
(A + 1   )Lw
fA
; n
 = 0. (21)

























M + 1)   2M

f(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AM   1)2 > 0, (23)


















from (19) and (20). Thus, we know that !=! decreases in M at the interior equilibrium.











(A + 1   )Lw
fA
A > 0;
from (18) and (21). These imply that ! is independent of M, while ! must increase in
M.















which implies that ! increases in M for a small M at the interior equilibrium. However,


























A [(2   1)A   (1   )(   1)] > 0:


















  1 > 0.
Therefore, T(A) = 0 has a unique solution 
]
A 2 (1;[=(1 )]1=( 1)), which is illustrated
in Figure 1. We summarize the results as follows:
11Proposition 4 If good A is costly tradable (i.e., A 2 (1;e A)),
(i) ! increases in M, and the ratio !=! decreases in M;
(ii) at the interior equilibrium, ! increases in M when A > 
]
A and has an inverted
U-shaped relationship with M when A < 
]
A;
(iii) for a corner equilibrium, ! is independent of M.
Proof: Both (i) and (iii) are already shown in the context, so we here prove (ii). The




M + 1   2
AM

, which decreases in M 2 (0;1).
Thus, we need to evaluate (22) at M = e M, which is the maximum value of M making




Ae M) = sign T(A). 
While Proposition 2 (ii) shows that the rm number in the smaller country evolves
as a U-shaped curve when M decreases, Proposition 4 shows that the welfare in the
country monotonically increases. This is basically because falling M lowers the prices
of imported goods and contributes to the welfare improvement. This eect dominates
the negative eect of decreasing rms in the smaller country. Interestingly, this is not
true for the larger country. This is because the converse might be true for a small A.
Intuitively, when A < 
]
A, most rms (or all rms) could agglomerate in the larger
country because the dispersion force based on the wage dierential is small. Nevertheless,
the rm share returns to the population share when M becomes so small that good A
becomes nontraded. The negative eect of a rm relocation is relatively large for a small
A, which dominates the positive eect of falling M, so the welfare in N becomes lower.
The model of Helpman and Krugman (1985) is the case of A = 1. In a similar manner,
we conclude that the following results hold for their case: (i) at the interior equilibrium,
both ! and ! increase in M, and their ratio !=! is independent of M;6 (ii) for a corner
equilibrium, ! is independent of M, ! increases in M, and their ratio !=! decreases
in M. Therefore, an integration of manufacturing markets basically improves the welfare
of both countries, which is similar to the result of Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2000,
Section 3) based on a two-factor model. This is because, in both papers, the assumption
of costless agricultural transportation, which equalizes wages in two countries and does
not capture the U-shaped evolution of rm location, is imposed.
6For A = 1, (24) becomes 0.
124.1.2 The case of nontradable good A
In this case, manufacturing rms are distributed in proportion to country size. Specically,









respectively, and the equilibrium wage in N is e w, the unique solution of (14). Recall that
e w = e A 2 (1;
 1

M ) holds and e w decreases in M.



















1 M + (1   )

. (26)
According to (26), ! increases in M since e w decreases in M.
On the other hand,
@ e w 1M
@M







e w2(1   ) + e w(   1) + M e w [(   1)(1   )   e w(   2)]
 e w2F 0(w)
, (27)
where the second equality is obtained by the implicit function theorem. Since F 0(w) < 0,
the denominator is positive. Then, if (   1)(1   )   e w(   2)  0, (27) is evidently
positive. Otherwise, we have
e w(   1) + M e w
 [(   1)(1   )   e w(   2)]
>e w(   1) + [(   1)(1   )   e w(   2)]
=e w + (   1)(1   )
>0,
where the rst inequality is from e w < 
 1

M . Therefore, (27) is always positive, which
implies that ! increases in M.
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where the last inequality is from the fact that e w decreases in M. Thus, we know that
!=! decreases in M.
The above results are summarized as follows:
Proposition 5 If good A is nontradable (i.e., A  e A), both ! and !increase in M,
and their ratio !=!
 decreases in M.
It is noteworthy that w decreases, while the number of rms in each country does not
change when A is nontradable. Thus, the welfare in S clearly increases, since the price
of imported varieties in country S (i.e.,  p = wM) decreases. With respect to country
N, the decreasing w reduces the income as well as the price index of the manufactured
goods. Proposition 5 concludes that the positive eect dominates the negative one and
the welfare in N also increases.
Our model is general enough to include the model of Krugman (1980, Section II) as a
special case of  = 1 (without sector A). Thus, Proposition 5 also holds for his setup.
4.2 Falling A

























AM   1)2 > 0;
at the interior equilibrium. In other words, ! increases in A(= 
1 
A ), while ! decreases




















7If A  e A, good A is not traded, and, thus, decreasing A does not change the equilibrium.






















from (16) and the fact that w = A. Thus, we know that !=! decreases in A.
The above results are summarized as follows:
Proposition 6 If good A is tradable (i.e., A 2 [1;e A)),
(i) ! increases in A;
(ii) at the interior equilibrium, ! decreases in A, and !=!
 increases in A;
(iii) for a corner equilibrium, ! increases in A, and !=!
 decreases in A.
When A falls, w decreases, and n (resp. n) increases (resp. decreases), while M
does not change. With respect to the welfare in country N, Proposition 6 shows that the
positive eect of increasing n dominates the negative eect of decreasing w. On the other
hand, with respect to the welfare in S, the negative eect of decreasing n dominates the
positive eect of decreasing the price of imported varieties in the country. At rst glance,
the above result (ii) might be counterintuitive because increasing A improves S's export
of A. However, our model captures the sectoral labor movement. A large agricultural
sector in S results in a small manufacturing sector and, nally, decreases the welfare in S.
4.3 Discussion
For the interior equilibrium case, our results in Propositions 1-6 are summarized in Table
1, where a falling M is represented by \M "" and a falling A is represented by \A "".
Table 1: Eects of globalization at interior equilibrium
n n w ! ! !=!




small A   + 0 + +  
large A   + 0   +  
nontradable A 0 0   + +  
A " +     +   +
Notes: +: increase;  : decrease; 0: no change
15Immediately, we nd that integrating the agricultural markets is very contrastive to
integrating the manufacturing markets from the viewpoint of welfare. In fact, the wel-
fare in the smaller country is improved, and the welfare dierential (in terms of welfare
ratio) becomes smaller when the manufacturing markets are more integrated. However,
the welfare in the smaller country is lowered, and the welfare dierential becomes larger
when the agricultural markets are more integrated. In other words, while the integration
of manufacturing markets does not threaten the smaller country, the integration of agri-
cultural markets does. This implies that increasing the trade freeness of dierentiated
varieties is benecial to small countries even if it drives rms there to relocate to a larger
country. Meanwhile, although increasing A also contributes to decreasing the price of
imported varieties via decreasing the wage in the larger country, such a positive eect is
not suciently large to dominate the negative eect of decreasing rm share.
The above result, revealing the importance of balancing the trade barriers of two
sectors, is interesting to trade policy makers. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, the Corn Laws protected corn prices against competition from less expensive
foreign imports between 1815 and 1846. It was thought to be dangerous for Britain to
rely on imported corn as lower prices would reduce labor wages and manufacturers would
lose out due to the fall in purchasing power of landlords and farmers. The abolition
of the Corn Laws marked a signicant step towards free trade. While the immediate
impact of repealing the Corn Laws was not great (Grigg, 1989, p.21), it paved the way for
the agricultural depression after 1870 on the one hand and increased industrial activities
leading to the industrial agglomeration in the UK on the other.
Even now, although many countries reduce the trade barriers in both sectors and
harmonize the numerous regulations that govern international trade, Japan continues
to protect its agricultural markets. Indeed, the existing bilateral economic partnership
agreements into which Japan has entered have all exempted agricultural products from any
elimination of taris. A recent trade organization, called the Trans-Pacic Partnership
(TPP), requires member countries to open both markets; thus, Japan is very reluctant to
participate. Given the large trade surplus in the manufacturing sector, Japan corresponds
to the large country in our model, as did the UK in the 19th Century. Besides the theory
of comparative advantage (rst nature), our NTT results based on the second nature
(imperfect competition and the technology of increasing returns to scale) also suggest
that integrating the agricultural markets should improve the national welfare.
Finally, our analysis reveals that ! and ! may change in dierent directions, as shown
by two   s in Table 1. This suggests possible conicts of interest within the free trade
policy. With respect to the Free Trade Agreements (FTA), the conict of interest oc-
16curs when manufacturing rms go from a developed country to a developing country in
order to save labor costs, resulting in the emergence of NIEs. To prevent the relocation
of rms, developed economies sometimes oppose the freer trade of manufacturing goods.
For example, the United States and Korea ratied a U.S.-Korea FTA in November 2010.
However, its negotiation was long delayed due to the controversial issues regarding auto-
mobiles. By a U.S. request, the agreement nally allowed for the United States to retain
a 2.5 percent tari on vehicle imports until the fth year.
5 Concluding Remarks
This study is an examination of the eects of globalization (i.e., falling trade costs) on
industrial location and national welfare. We use the Helpman-Krugman-Davis model
with two countries, one factor, and two industries, both of which incur trade costs. The
following results were obtained.
First, we found a necessary and sucient condition for the HME to be observed. The
condition is in regard to the trade costs of manufacturing and agricultural goods, and
the result is helpful for a comprehensive understanding of some known results throughout
the literature. Second, when the manufacturing markets are more integrated, the rm
number in the larger country (resp. the smaller country) evolves as an inverted U-shaped
curve (resp. a U-shaped curve). Meanwhile, the welfare in the smaller country must be
better o, while the welfare in the larger country could be worse o. Third, when the
agricultural markets are more integrated, the rm number in the larger country (resp.
the smaller country) monotonically increases (resp. decreases). Meanwhile, the welfare
in the smaller country must be worse o at the interior equilibrium while the welfare in
the larger country must be improved.
In summary, the integration of manufacturing markets does not threaten the smaller
country even if more rms relocate to the larger country. Rather, the integration of
agricultural markets threatens the smaller country.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 1
The case of nontraded A is already considered in the text, so we analyze the case of
traded A here. First, we show that it is impossible that all rms agglomerate in country
S. Otherwise, country N imports good M, which implies that country N exports good A
and w = 1=A by the trade balance. Noting n = 0 and w = 1=A, the market-clearing











19The number of agricultural workers in S is
(1   )L
w   n









from (9), and, thus, the import of good A in S is



















On the other hand, the export of good A from N is






which is always smaller than (28). Therefore, it is impossible that all rms agglomerate
in country S.
Second, we show that it is impossible that all rms agglomerate in country N for
A  e A. Otherwise, country N imports good A, which implies w = A. From (10),
(11), n = 0 and w = A, the market-clearing condition for each manufacturing variety
















































The LHS is increasing in A. On the other hand, when A = e A, the LHS of (31) is
(e AM   e 
1 






























































Therefore, the LHS of (31) is positive for A  e A, which implies that the agglomeration
never occurs for A  e A.
Next, we consider an interior equilibrium. We rst assume that the larger country N











































Since the above two terms are positive, we obtain a necessary condition for the interior
equilibrium:
A   AM > 0: (34)
From (32) and (33), the numbers of rms in two countries are expressed as (19) and
(20). Then, using these equations, we have








where F() is dened in (14). The denominator of (35) is positive from (34). Since F() is
a decreasing function and F(e A) = 0, we have n (n+n) > 0 for all A 2 [1;e A), which
implies that the HME exists for all A 2 [1;e A). Noting that the labor input of rms in
both countries are the same given by (9), the inequality, n   (n + n) > 0, implies that
the the share of good A produced in N is less than . Meanwhile, the share of good A
consumed in N is  from (2), (3) and (7). Therefore, we conrm that country N is an
importer of good A.
21On the other hand, when A > e A, we have n   (n + n) < 0. By the same logic
used above, country N must be an exporter of good A, which contradicts the assumption
that N is the importer of good A. Thus, a necessary condition for N to be the importer
of good A is that A < e A.
Here, we show that it is impossible for the smaller country S to be the importer of
good A. Otherwise, the equilibrium wage in N is w = 1=A < 1. Similar to the previous
arguments, we have

















where the inequality is from the following facts: (a) 
 
A > M, which can be derived
similar to (34); (b) F() is decreasing; (c) F(1) > 0 and A > 1. Therefore, country N
must be an importer of good A, which contradicts the assumption that N is the exporter
of good A.
Summing up the above discussion, good A is not traded and the HME disappears if
A  e A. Otherwise, country N imports (resp. exports) good A (resp. good M) and the
HME appears. 
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Noting A  
1 
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from (19) and (20). In other words, the rm number in the larger (resp. smaller) country
monotonically increases (resp. decreases) when A decreases.
(ii) Even if good A is traded initially, it becomes nontradable when M increases
and reaches a threshold, as can be seen in Figure 1. The threshold is obtained by solving





A [A   (1   )2
A ]
A   (1   )
. (36)
22If A < e A, it must hold that
A > (1   )
2
A , (37)
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A   1)2 > 0,
where all inequalities are from (37).
Furthermore, we know that both
@n
@M




have at most two roots. Thus, we conclude that @n
@M(M) (resp. @n
@M(M)) is concave
(resp. convex) for M 2 [0;1]. 
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